Introduction
This chapter will examine the evolving security perspectives of the East European states, particularly in the period surrounding the onset and current continuation of the Iraq War and insurgency . Historically, one can discern quite distinct patterns of political and socio-economic development between the states of Western Europe and those of Eastern Europe. This division includes rather differentiated East-West European perspectives toward world affairs and questions of defence and security. Finding themselves typically caught between influences from the more politically and economically advanced dynamism of Western Europe and the turbulent and more stagnant evolution of regimes farther to the East, the states and peoples of East-Central Europe and South-eastern Europe have exhibited a unique, albeit not uniform, set of developmental and security imperatives. For example, throughout the twentieth century and into the early twenty-first century East European elites, when free to choose their own orientation, have more often than not been obsessed with overcoming their chronic position on the margins or periphery of West European political and economic currents, and are also anxious to benefit from the security against external threats that might be offered by full inclusion in a pan-European security framework.
Even after the end of the Cold War, as pressures for the absorption of the Central and East European states into the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) accelerated -with the goal of creating one 'indivisible Europe' -signs of Europe's geopolitical differentiation remain quite apparent. Do such intra-European divisionswhich were apparent before, during and immediately after the phase of communist rule -continue to characterize security perspectives in Europe?
Iraq and transatlantic relations: the 'old Europe'-'new Europe' tempest
One byproduct of the transatlantic rift that emerged between the United States and some European states during the 2003 debate surrounding the invasion of Iraq was the enhanced awareness of the substantial variation between the security perspectives of long-time EU and NATO member states, and the outlook of East European countries that were either formally scheduled to join the Euro-Atlantic alliance framework or were under serious consideration for eventual entry into the EU and NATO. At the time of the Iraqi invasion in March 2003, seven Eastern European countries (Slovakia, Slovenia, Bulgaria, Romania, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) were one year away from joining NATO. Together with Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary, which had joined the military alliance in April 1999, this new enlargement would mean that ten of 26 NATO members would be former communist states. The EU was also on the eve of adding ten new members in 2004, of which eight were former communist states. Bulgaria and Romania, who were to be part of the 2004 NATO enlargement, were also slated to become EU members in 2007.
When, near the end of January 2003, the American Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, made his indelicate and now infamous distinction between 'old Europe' and 'new Europe', intra-European divergence regarding security issues became a more highly sensitive feature in transatlantic discourse. According to Rumsfeld, the Franco-German-led opposition to the Iraq War was a reflection of thinking in the old Europe, and he claimed that 'if you look at the entire NATO today [2003] , the center of gravity is shifting to the east'. 1 Rumsfeld's tactical dichotomy of Europe's political orientation was quickly followed by the signing of public letters in support of the United States' position concerning Iraq; first the 'Letter of Eight' (the UK, Spain, Italy, Denmark, Portugal, Romania, Hungary and the Czech Republic) on 30 January 2003, and then the 'letter of the Vilnius 10' group of East European states (the three Baltic countries, Slovakia, Slovenia, Bulgaria and Romania -all in the queue for NATO membership -plus, Albania, Macedonia and Croatia) on 5 February. Bruce Jackson, a former US military intelligence official and one-time arms industry lobbyist, played a key role in the preparation of both letters.
